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anti-Judaism prejudiced Christians against the Hebrew Bible and particularly 
the Sabbath. A few sixteenth-century Anabaptists (Oswald Glait, Andreas 
Fischer, and some of  the early Hutterites) saw that if  the norm for following 
Jesus is the whole Scripture, stripped of  distorting tradition, then the recovery 
of  the seventh-day Sabbath would not only restore the biblical teaching, but 
remove a major obstacle to peacemaking and reconciliation between Jewish 
and Christian believers (Daniel Liechty, Sabbatarianism in the Sixteenth Century 
[Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1993], 6-7).
By projecting Anabaptist values into the twenty-first century, The Naked 
Anabaptist makes a valuable contribution. But the project of  extending the 
sixteenth-century Radical Reformation remains a work in progress.
Andrews University                                            Jerry moon
Pugliese, Marc A. The One, the Many and the Trinity: Joseph A. Bracken and the 
Challenge of  Process Metaphysics. Washington, DC: The Catholic University 
of  America Press, 2011. 297 pp. Hardcover, $69.95.
This extensively researched and well-written book represents an ambitious 
undertaking. In four rather dense chapters, Marc Pugliese explores an 
impressive range of  topics under the rubric of  philosophy’s original and most 
fundamental question—What is the one from which the many come? He provides a 
description of  process philosophy; an account of  Joseph Bracken’s Trinitarian 
thought, which utilizes process thought; a critique of  process attempts to 
solve the problem of  the one and the many; and an appeal to classical theism 
as the only adequate solution.
Chapter 1 begins with an informative review of  the somewhat neglected 
background of  process philosophy, noting how such factors as science, the 
rise of  historical consciousness, and the turn to the subject have shaped the 
modern mentality. Next it explains the essential components of  Whitehead’s 
metaphysics—the central claim that reality consists of  social process and 
the role that such concepts as creativity, concrescence, actual entities, eternal 
objects play in his development of  this claim. It concludes by describing 
various ways in which other thinkers have drawn on the elements of  process 
thought—particularly its dipolar view of  God—including Charles Hartshorne, 
influential liberal theologians such as John B. Cobb Jr., and Schubert M. 
Ogden, and conservative theologians who embrace “open theism.” 
Chapter 2 is devoted to the trinitarian theology of  Joseph A. Bracken, 
who employs the elements of  process thought more extensively than any 
other thinker within the Catholic tradition. Bracken modifies Whitehead’s 
metaphysical scheme by maintaining that social units are just as important as 
individual ones, such as actual entities, in the ultimate scheme of  things. This 
provides a helpful connection with the Christian view of  the Trinity. Bracken 
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accepts the traditional claim that God is the sole infinite being, who exists 
necessarily, but he attributes to the divine Act of  Being both interrelationship 
and temporality. This yields a unique version of  social trinitarianism, according 
to which God comprises three distinct centers of  consciousness, mind, and 
will, who “all think and will the same thing in virtue of  the perfect harmony 
of  love which they are as a community (128).
In Chapters 3 and 4, Pugliese presents his basic critique of  process 
thought and sets forth his preferred alternative. No matter what form it takes, 
he argues, process thought fails to solve the problem of  the one and many. Its 
essential flaw is “the problem of  mutual ultimate causality,” a difficulty that 
stems from the basic process premise that “God is not to be treated as an 
exception to metaphysical principles, . . . [but as] their chief  exemplification.” 
According to process thought, ultimate reality is characterized by polarities, 
contrasting categorical pairs that arise from the analysis of  creaturely, or 
proportionate, being. Thus, ultimate reality is thought to be both absolute 
and relative, both eternal and temporal, both cause and effect, both changing 
and unchanging.
In Pugliese’s view, this simply won’t do. It is impossible to explain all 
of  reality in terms of  the metaphysics drawn from proportionate being, he 
asserts, because none of  the terms in these categorical contrasts can account 
for itself  and the other together (163). Such an account requires “reference to 
a transcendent being that is an exception to the metaphysics of  proportionate 
being,” a quality that classical theism attributes to God. Indeed, the very 
problem of  the one and the many arises “from attempting to make categorical 
unity and plurality, which are finite and not self-subsistent, ultimate reality” 
(207), or to put it another way, from a neglect of  the “Creator-creature 
distinction as classically conceived” (179).
To solve the problem of  the one and many, or, more accurately, to avoid 
the problem, we should acknowledge that the categorical contrasts drawn 
from finite, or proportionate, being, do not apply to God. The Creator-
creature distinction is essential to an adequate metaphysics, and it resists 
assimilating God to creaturely derived concepts.
So, just how does invoking God resolve the problem of  the one and 
the many? Pugliese doesn’t really say. Instead, his proposal consists of  
(a) denying that the metaphysical categories that account for reality as we 
otherwise experience it apply to God, and (b) asserting that these categories 
are mysteriously united in God in ways that we cannot comprehend. Here 
“we affirm what we cannot conceive,” viz., how the three divine persons are 
identical with the divine essence yet distinct from one another. Similarly, “only 
in the infinitely transcendent, incomprehensible God can we say, without full 
understanding, that what we know and speak of  as the one and the many 
from finite categorical created reality are truly identical ways that can never be 
so in creation” (243).
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As I see it, his constructive proposal offers little that is really constructive. 
On close inspection, it does little more than dismiss process theism in favor 
of  a Thomistic form of  traditional theism. What’s missing is a careful 
comparison of  the two. According to classical theism, as Pugliese describes it, 
the divine reality somehow encompasses both sides of  categorical contrasts, 
but it does so in ways that are beyond our comprehension. We may assert, or 
confess, that God is both absolute and relative, for example, but we have no 
way of  knowing just how that is the case.
To the contrary, process theism presents a clear and cogent account of  
divine dipolarity, and it is disappointing that Pugliese fails to consider it. For 
process theists, we preserve God’s generic excellence, not by attributing one 
side of  a categorical contrast to God and denying the other, nor by maintaining 
that the two mysteriously coalesce when applied to God. Instead, we uphold 
God’s excellence by noting that each side of  the categorical contrasts admits 
of  a supreme or excellent form and that both apply to God. Thus, God is 
relative as well as absolute, both changing and unchanging, both cause and 
effect, in unique and supremely excellent ways.
Moreover, any supposed tension or conflict between the two is resolved 
by attributing each pole to a distinct aspect of  the divine being. Dipolar theism 
does not consist in the mere assertion that God is both temporal and eternal, 
for example, or both absolute and relative. Instead, it applies each side of  the 
polar contrasts to a distinct aspect of  God’s reality. “Eternal” and “absolute,” 
for example, pertain to God’s essential, changeless nature—what it is that 
makes God God. In contrast, what is temporal and relative about God is 
God’s concrete, ever changing, concrete dynamic experience. The latter refers 
to the total divine reality; the former, to God’s essential identity. Thus, God, 
and only God, is eternally, or timelessly, temporal. God, and only God, is 
absolutely relative—relative to, affected by, all that is and ever will be.
With dipolarity thus conceived, there is no need to obscure the application 
of  contrasting categories to God with a shroud of  inscrutability, as Pugliese 
does. How the two apply to God is by no means beyond our understanding; 
it is eminently clear. And it makes sense of  the divine nature in ways that 
classical theism is notoriously unable to do.
Moreover, in spite of  his extensive exposition of  Bracken’s trinitarianism, 
Pugliese seems to miss its important implications for the question at hand. If  
ultimate reality consists of  supreme personal being, as theists affirm, and 
if  God as such comprises the distinct persons of  Father, Son, and Spirit, 
as trinitarian theists, including Bracken and Pugliese, affirm, then it follows 
that relationality, not undifferentiated unity, must be utterly basic to reality. 
Trinitarian thought thus provides a coherent solution to the problem of  the 
one and the many. Trinitarian theism provides a vision of  ultimate reality as 
inherently complex.
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Despite my differences with Pugliese’s views, I appreciate the fact that 
he takes on an issue of  great importance and grapples with it in a substantive 
way. Seminary and graduate students will profit from reading his work.
Loma Linda University                richard rice
Loma Linda, California
Seibert, Eric A. Disturbing Divine Behavior: Troubling Old Testament Images of  God. 
Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2009. xii + 347 pp. Paperback, $22.00.
Eric A. Seibert seeks to clarify the Bible’s picture of  God by addressing certain 
problematic portrayals of  the OT narratives. The introduction, “Thinking 
Rightly About God and the Problem of  the OT,” is almost as provocatively 
titled as the book. Disturbing Divine Behavior is divided into three parts, an 
epilogue, and two significant appendices, “Reexamining the Nonviolent God” 
and “Inspiration and the Authority of  Scripture.” The latter appendix will 
be of  special interest to scholars in biblical studies and systematic theology. 
There are also three online features available for downloading at Seibert’s 
website, including (1) advice on using the book as a class text, (2) sample study 
questions on the book as a whole, for each chapter and both appendices, and 
(3) an entire syllabus for Seibert’s course on “Topics in Biblical Theology: 
Divine Violence.”
Early on, Seibert complicates his task by referencing Jack Nelson-
Pallmeyer’s comment on his own catechistic experience. Nelson-Pallmeyer 
remembers being silenced by an authoritarian instructor when he raised 
questions about God’s drowning everybody, allowing earthquakes, and 
consigning babies to hell because they died before being baptized (8). Seibert 
dedicates chapter 4 to addressing the problems presented in these types of  
events and to reviewing various ways people justify God’s odd OT behavior, 
including approaches such as “divine immunity,” “just cause,” and the “greater 
good.” 
Consistent with the “divine immunity” approach, whatever happens in 
God’s name is appropriate since God qua God cannot err (71-74). According 
to the “just cause” explanation, whatever God does, he does with good 
reason. Illustrative of  this is the universal flood of  Genesis 6–8, necessitated 
by widespread human wickedness (74-77). In the “greater good” approach, a 
“subcategory” of  “just cause,” Seibert underlines the limitations of  arguments 
by scholars such as Gleason Archer (Encyclopedia of  Bible Difficulties), Terence 
Fretheim (God and Violence in the OT), and Tremper Longman III (The Case for 
Spiritual Continuity) (77-80) to show that the end of  “greater good” cannot be 
justified, especially given the suffering of  some of  society’s most innocent in 
the process of  mass destruction.
